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AfD  Alternative für Deutschland
CEAS  Common European Asylum System
CMR  Central Mediterranean route
EASO  European Asylum Support Office
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FPÖ  Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs
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4Executive summary 
The year 2015 marked the arrival of an unprecedented 
number of migrants and refugees in the EU. Soon 
politicians, policymakers and the press dubbed these 
events a ‘migration crisis’. With the steep increase in 
public attention putting migration at the very top of the 
political agenda, right-wing populist parties saw their 
chance to capitalise on voters’ concerns in a vast majority 
of EU member states. 
It also led to migration becoming an even more 
‘emotional’ topic that is not easily communicated 
yet strongly resonates with audiences across the 
continent. The European Commission, as the institution 
responsible for proposing policies to tackle the ‘crisis’ 
and for communicating them to the public, is of special 
significance	in	this	context.	Its	role	in	contributing	to	
and reinforcing the ‘migration crisis’ narrative through 
its communications should therefore be subject to 
scrutiny. It is clear that the Commission has strategically 
applied the crisis narrative over the course of the past 
five	years,	as	it	developed	from	a	rather	unstructured	
use of several words and phrases, to a coherent story 
about the ‘crisis’ as a stand-alone and historically 
unprecedented phenomenon. In response to the ‘crisis’, 
the Commission’s approach gradually morphed from a 
humanitarian framing (2015-16) into one focused on 
border management (circa 2017) and cooperation with 
third countries to manage migration (2018 onwards). In 
2019 the Commission declared the ‘crisis’ to be over.
The Commission communicated about the so-called 
crisis, including its supposed end, on the basis of two 
factors: (i) numbers and (ii) the uncontrolled nature of 
arrivals. However, this Discussion Paper argues that, 
overall, the Commission’s use of the crisis narrative 
has not been accurate, neither as a description of past 
phenomena nor as way to address citizens’ concerns. 
Rather, it served the purpose of framing migration as a 
security issue and legitimised restrictive policy measures 
meant to ‘tackle the crisis’. These included, for instance, 
ramped up border controls or increased cooperation with 
third countries to curb migration.
More	specifically,	the	Commission’s	continued	reliance	on	
and	application	of	this	narrative	is	flawed	for	three	reasons:	
q  first,	it	does	not	take	into	account	the	far	larger	
numbers of refugees hosted in third countries and other 
ongoing humanitarian crises, which in comparison, did 
not receive the same amount of attention;
q  second, conceptualising the ‘crisis’ in terms of 
numbers misses the mark in addressing citizens’ main 
concerns about migration;
q  third,	this	narrative	ignores	the	fact	that	a	significant	
part of the ‘crisis’ is related to the mismanaged policy 
responses, rather than the number or nature of arrivals.
More problematic, however, is that this narrative has 
contributed to an environment wherein right-wing 
populists are given ample room to spread their message. 
They have been able to legitimise control-oriented 
measures as a way to tackle the ‘crisis’. Mainstream 
politicians have also increasingly adopted a security-
oriented discourse on migration, in the hope of appealing 
to voters in favour of more restrictive measures. 
This Paper puts forward a number of recommendations to 
counter these dynamics and create a more forward-looking 
narrative on migration. It argues that the Commission 
should abandon the crisis narrative and develop a more 
proactive	and	diversified	communication	strategy	instead,	
which would include the following elements:
q  Issue salience: The Commission should be aware 
of the impact of frequently communicating about 
migration on public opinion, political decision-
making	and	the	rising	influence	of	anti-immigration	
forces. This awareness, however, should not stop 
the Commission from communicating all together. 
Clearly, not communicating about migration is not a 
viable option and could actually play into the hands of 
right-wing populist forces that have no qualms about 
using the subject as a tool to stir fear and distrust. 
Rather than the frequency, it is the tone and content of 
communication on migration that should be adjusted.
q  More diverse frames: It is important to abandon 
narratives that present refugees and migrants, and 
in particular their numbers, as an issue that needs to 
be addressed in the framework of crisis management. 
This discourse can easily be co-opted by right-wing 
populist actors and used to blame the EU for not doing 
enough. To adequately pre-empt these dynamics, 
the Commission should diversify the frames it uses 
when communicating about migration. Instead of 
employing a security frame by default, a greater range 
of frames that draw on economic or humanitarian 
aspects and are adaptable to different contexts and 
situations would lead to a more balanced discussion 
on migration.
q  Storytelling: Communication about migration 
should	find	a	healthier	balance	between	data	and	
stories. Personal testimonies and storytelling are 
very effective in raising an audience’s empathy levels 
and giving a face to complex processes. Conversely, 
numbers	and	statistics	are	more	difficult	to	convey	to	
an audience and can complicate direct communication 
as they almost always require further explanation. 
However, evidence and facts should remain the 
foundation of all EU communications on migration. 
q  Targeting of audience groups: The Commission 
should gain a better understanding of the diverse 
audiences in EU member states and shape its 
communications to better target them. In this respect, 
5it is helpful to take note of research that has studied 
audiences at the national level and to differentiate 
between	society	groups	that	are	specific	to	EU	member	
states. With respect to audience segmentation, it is 
important to focus more on the so-called movable 
middle, which seems to be more open to positive 
messages about migration than previously assumed. 
At the same time, other audience segments must 
not be ignored. It is important for the content of the 
Commission’s messages to be consistent and coherent 
throughout. However, the delivery could still be tailored 
by taking into account the values of the targeted 
audience group.
q  More relatable and digestible messages: The 
Commission should put a greater focus on making the 
style and tone of its communications more relatable, 
for instance by clarifying the impact of its policies on 
individuals’ lives. In addition, messages on migration 
should be presented in a more digestible manner. 
This could be done, for instance, by empowering 
Commission staff to become ‘ambassadors’ who 
communicate directly to their national audiences, 
both	online	and	offline.	Moreover,	translating	all	
communications	into	the	EU’s	official	24	languages	is	
key in building a better rapport with citizens.
q  Migration issues correctly contextualised: Often, 
migration issues are wrongly linked to particular 
problems	that	would	find	a	more	accurate	answer	in	
other policy areas, such as labour market reforms. The 
Commission should take this into account to avoid 
migration being used as a scapegoat for other issues.
6Introduction
2015 marked the arrival of an unprecedented number 
of migrants and refugees coming to the EU. The public 
attention towards these events placed migration at the 
very top of the political agenda. It also led to migration 
becoming an even more emotionalised topic that is 
not easily communicated, yet resonates with audiences 
strongly. As migration and asylum policies have 
increasingly moved to the European level in the last 
decades, the stakes are raised for European institutions 
to communicate their policies and feed them back to 
European citizens. 
In parallel to an increased focus on border and migration 
control measures in EU policy circles, the European 
Commission centred its communications around the 
narrative of a migration ‘crisis’. Gradually, and over the 
years that followed, this narrative evolved from focusing 
on relocation and saving lives in the Mediterranean 
(2015-16) to one on controlling the EU’s borders (circa 
2017), to increased cooperation with third countries to 
manage migration (2018 onwards). 
Generally, this narrative served the purpose of 
framing migration as a security issue and legitimised 
extraordinary measures aiming to tackle the ‘crisis’. 
However, and especially with the rise of populism 
across European countries, it has become clear that 
communication on migration does not gain anything 
from pushing the crisis narrative. Rather, it opens up a 
space in which right-wing populist ideas are normalised 
and	amplified.	This	also	creates	a	basis	for	legitimising	
more restrictive and control-oriented migration policies.
It has become clear that communication 
on migration does not gain anything from 
pushing the crisis narrative.
In 2019, the Commission declared Europe to be “no 
longer in crisis mode”.1 This statement raises the question 
of what will come next and how the new von der Leyen 
Commission will pick up this thread.
The Commission’s communication output has particular 
importance. Given that the Commission has the ‘right 
of initiative’, its communication must convey the 
overall direction of policy proposals developed; and 
the message the Commission conveys has a potentially 
significant	impact.	For	this	reason,	this	Discussion	
Paper mainly focuses on the Commission’s framing of 
the migration crisis narrative.2 At the same time, it is 
important to acknowledge that other actors such as the 
EU Council and member states also applied narratives 
on migration and therefore actively contributed to an 
interpretation and understanding of the ‘crisis’ in  
this context.
This Paper rests on a review of selected Commission 
communications. Altogether, 14 central texts, issued 
between 2015 and 2019, were examined to analyse 
and showcase the chronological development of the 
Commission’s crisis narrative.3 This selection does not aim 
to be exhaustive, but rather to deconstruct the discursive 
development of the migration crisis narrative by 
focusing on regular communicative updates.4 
In addition, the analysis of this Paper also took account 
of speeches and public comments made by prominent 
Commission representatives, such as former President 
Jean-Claude Juncker and former Commissioner for 
Migration and Home Affairs Dimitris Avramopoulos, 
and of semi-structured interviews conducted with 
communication actors during the summer of 2019. 
Interviewees mainly stemmed from an EU institutional 
background. Also, several interviews were also conducted 
with communication actors from NGOs to help sketch 
a wider understanding of the Commission’s strategic 
communications. 
This	Paper	also	profited	from	a	series	of	roundtable	
discussions held in Brussels during 2019. The discussions 
included	communication	officials	from	EU	institutions,	
communication actors from civil society organisations 
and think tanks, as well as academic experts.
Finally,	the	analysis	reflects	expert	literature	on	‘frames’	
and	‘narratives’.	Frames	are	defined	as	communicative	
constructs	that	convey	a	specific	interpretation	by	
selectively presenting information.5 They help to build 
narratives which often serve to establish a commonly 
shared perception of a problem and therefore also 
increase support for a chosen approach to tackle the 
problem.6 Both frames and narratives are highly complex 
discursive instruments that, when applied effectively, 
have a considerable impact on political communication. 
In	what	follows,	the	Paper’s	first	section	begins	by	
charting the prevailing migration crisis narrative at the 
EU level. A second section explains why the continued 
reliance on and application of this narrative is inaccurate. 
The	third	and	final	section	presents	new	potential	
strategies for the Commission’s communications 
on migration. It recommends a more proactive and 
diversified	approach	to	communicating	about	migration	
that moves away from the crisis narrative. Practical 
examples support the recommendations.
71.  Migration and the ‘crisis’: The European 
Commission’s strategic communication
The Commission’s framing of migration has generally 
taken place within the wider narrative of the migration 
‘crisis’, even if it has evolved over several years. The 
arrival of migrants during the summer of 2015	was	first	
communicated through a humanitarian frame, which 
set the context for a predominant narrative of refugees 
that came to Europe to seek protection. 
However, the focus soon turned to a frame of 
uncontrolled borders and migration as a security 
problem that needed to be tackled by an externalisation of 
border management. According to individuals interviewed 
for this project, a general shift in the climate of migration 
policies and, hence, communications took place: from 
an emphasis on relocation and saving lives in the 
Mediterranean (2015-16), to controlling the EU’s borders 
(circa 2017), to increased cooperation with third countries 
to manage migration (2018 onwards).7 Approaching the 
management of migration from different angles ultimately 
takes place within the wider narrative of the migration 
crisis. The following section details the developments and 
consequences of this communicative strategy.
1.1  SPRING 2015: THE ONSET OF THE  
CRISIS NARRATIVE
Following	a	number	of	shipwrecks	in	the	first	half	of	2015,	
and in particular an incident close to Lampedusa in April 
2015 that saw the loss of almost 300 lives, the Commission 
presented its European Agenda on Migration in May 
2015. The Agenda was conceived of as a seminal footprint 
addressing the immediate challenges in the Mediterranean 
and as a roadmap to charter medium- and long-term steps 
in developing the EU’s common asylum and migration 
policy more generally. In the document, the Commission 
already speaks of a ‘crisis’ without yet telling the story 
of the migration ‘crisis’. Instead, the document, through 
which	the	Commission	codified	its	migration	and	asylum	
policies for the years to come, presents the situation as one 
that could be followed by other crises:
“Every crisis will be different, but the EU needs 
to heed the lesson and be prepared to act in 
anticipation of a crisis, not just in reaction.”8 
 As such, the exact wording used in the document is 
rather	general:	“a	crisis”	and	“a	specific	crisis”	are	used	
interchangeably. Tellingly, the text in the beginning also 
highlights an awareness on the part of the Commission:   
“[m]isguided and stereotyped narratives often tend 
to focus only on certain types of flows, overlooking 
the inherent complexity of this phenomenon, which 
impacts society in many different ways and calls for 
a variety of responses”.9  
Moreover, other documents of the Commission’s 
first implementation package of May 2015 (e.g. 
the communication on resettlement, the EU action 
plan against migrant smuggling) do not make any 
crisis references at all. This shows that there was no 
strategic approach yet to constructing the story of the 
migration ‘crisis’. As discussed during interviews, EU 
communication	officials	saw	the	need	to	communicate	
on migration through a more pedagogical and ad hoc 
approach, as large parts of the audience were relatively 
uninformed about migration issues at that time.10 
The Commission’s communication  
on migration in spring 2015 shows  
that there was no strategic approach  
yet to constructing the story of the 
migration ‘crisis’.
1.2  SUMMER 2015: THE MANIFESTATION OF 
THE ‘CRISIS’
This	changed	significantly,	however,	after	the	summer of 
2015, which saw new records in migration arrival numbers 
on an almost daily basis.11 In September of the same 
year, the Commission released Addressing the Refugee 
Crisis in Europe: The Role of EU External Action, a Joint 
Communication with the European Parliament.12 It is 
striking that the title capitalises “crisis”, therefore giving 
it a stand-alone significance and bringing it to life as an 
event in and of itself. Research on discourses has found that 
neutral terms can initially turn into metaphors for larger 
developments over time. This then opens up the possibility 
of	redefining	certain	terms	in	different	contexts.13 The 
beginning of the Commission text is an example of such a 
development,	with	the	first	sentence	reading:	
 “The European Union (EU) is facing the largest 
refugee crisis since the end of World War II. The 
current situation has to be seen in a broader context 
of violent conflict and destabilisation in other 
parts of the world. It is a crisis of unprecedented 
magnitude that largely originates from conflicts and 
persecutions in Europe’s wider neighbourhood.”14
This	historical	contextualisation	is	significant	as	it	allows	
the reader to understand the current events in reference 
to the highly emotional frame of the Second World War. 
This induces the audience to understand the scale of the 
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biggest moment of disaster in the continent’s modern 
history. Moreover, it relates the ‘crisis’ to developments 
in neighbouring countries, therefore giving it a bigger 
geographical contextualisation. The narrative itself, 
however, is rather simplistic, especially as it does not 
clarify which European refugee movements it is referring 
to and disregards the dissimilar context of the Second 
World War. 
In addition, it is important to note that the Commission’s 
communication output during this time focused on 
‘refugees’ rather than ‘economic migrants’, a term that 
emerged in later Communications (see section 1.4). 
The former term was also used by former Commission 
President Juncker in public statements at the time:
“In spite of our fragility, our self-perceived 
weaknesses, today it is Europe that is sought as a 
place of refuge and exile. This is something to be 
proud of, though it is not without its challenges. 
The first priority today is and must be addressing 
the refugee crisis.”15 
This conceptualisation of events as the “refugee 
crisis”	is	significant	as	it	also	corresponds	with	
the humanitarian focus of policy responses during 
this time. As evident in the above quote, this 
communicational	concept	is	linked	to	a	self-definition	
of Europe as a place of protection for those seeking 
refuge. As such, this is a stark difference to the 
perceived need of managing migration that was 
communicated thereafter, and as analysed in the 
following sections. 
1.3  LATE SEPTEMBER 2015: MANAGING  
THE ‘CRISIS’
From	late	September	2015	onwards,	the	Commission	
started to publish regular, almost monthly, updates on 
“managing the refugee crisis”. In parallel, the general 
terminology used to describe the phenomenon became 
much	more	consistent.	This	can	be	seen	toreflect	
a strategic decision to solidify the ‘crisis’, both 
linguistically as well as in policy terms. It is also worth 
noting that in these communications, the Commission 
presented itself in the active role of the ‘manager’ of the 
‘crisis’, thereby trying to gain legitimacy for advancing 
a European approach to migration and asylum policies 
as opposed to national ones in a politically tense time. 
This also entailed a strong EU involvement in the 
operationalisation of the ‘hotspots’ in Italy and Greece, 
particularly through the set-up of the European Asylum 
Support	Office	(EASO)	and	the	European	Border	and	
Coast Guard Agency (EBCG). In presenting itself as the 
‘manager of the crisis’, the Commission makes use of 
several instruments: focusing on personal stories, calling 
on member states to act and admonishing them for lack 
of implementation of policies. In what follows, these 
three instruments are considered in turn.
To begin with, the Commission includes personal 
stories in these communications to convey the 
progress of policies. This is the case, for instance, in an 
October	2015	communication	on	the	first	relocation	
exercise. A textbox details “taking 19 Eritreans to start 
a new life in Sweden” from Italy as an “important 
symbolic moment”.16 Aside from covering some of the 
more operational aspects, the communication also 
describes how asylum seekers’ initial reluctance to 
trust the system was overcome following the efforts of 
Commission envoys and NGOs, leading to “queues of 
people wanting to register”.17 
It is clear that the Commission attempted to give 
relocated migrants a more human face with these 
communicative choices. However, it is doubtful 
whether this was actually successful, given that this 
communication also relies quite heavily on institutional 
and operational facts. Generally, this example shows 
that the communicative style and narrative of the 
‘crisis’ does not easily lend itself to conveying more 
personal stories of migrants. Rather, it creates a 
context in which emergency instruments to manage the 
‘crisis’ on a larger scale are easier to communicate than 
stories of individuals affected by those policy measures 
on the ground.
The general terminology used to describe 
the phenomenon became much more 
consistent. This can be seen to reflect  
a strategic decision to solidify the  
‘crisis’, both linguistically as well as in 
policy terms.
Gradually, the Commission’s focus shifted away from 
such emotional stories to rely ever more frequently on 
communicating about the ‘crisis’ from a more global point 
of view instead. In early 2016, a communication on the 
state of play of actions under the European Agenda on 
Migration advised the following: 
 “While a reduction in flows is highly desirable in view 
of often overwhelmed national and local authorities, 
there should be no illusions that the refugee crisis 
will end before its root causes […] are addressed in 
a definite manner. The only responsible course of 
action is to face this reality and to explain it openly 
and honestly to citizens […].”18
Several things are conveyed through this line of 
communication.	For	one,	it	acknowledges	the	concerns	
of member states that face increasing pressure from 
their local and national administrations when processing 
arrivals. However, it also excludes the likelihood of a 
swift conclusion to this ‘emergency’, invoking a sense 
of responsibility and duty on the part of the Council 
and the Parliament – the addressees of this text – in 
communicating this to EU citizens. Afterwards, the 
focus	on	these	continuing	“flows”	gives	way	to	a	critical	
9assessment of the member states’ implementation of 
policy measures to tackle the ‘crisis’:
 “While important building blocks of a sustainable 
system of migration management are now in place 
on paper, it is their swift, full implementation on the 
ground that has been lacking. […] implementation 
was too slow. […] several deadlines have not 
been met and many commitments are still slow 
to be fulfilled. Political responsibilities need to be 
assumed at highest level in all Member States […].”19 
 
Gradually, the Commission’s focus shifted 
away from emotional stories to rely  
ever more frequently on communicating 
about the ‘crisis’ from a more global point 
of view instead.
This shows that it is important to consider not only 
when	the	Commission	defines	a	situation	as	a	‘crisis’,	
but also when it does not. The crisis narrative is thus 
more easily upheld by relatively vague descriptions 
of ‘flows’ of refugees or migrants. The failure of 
management on the part of the member states described 
in the paragraph above are serious enough for the 
Commission to call for “[r]estoring orderly management 
of borders” as “the most pressing priority for the 
European Union today.”20 However, this is not discussed 
within the narrative of a crisis. This Discussion Paper 
returns to this schism of what is and is not a ‘crisis’ in 
the third part.
1.4  SUMMER 2016 TO 2017: A FOCUS  
ON NUMBERS
During the summer of 2016, the Commission released 
a	communication	on	the	Partnership	Framework	with	
third countries. This was part of a significant step 
towards cooperating with outside partners to 
manage migration. At the very beginning of the text, 
the Commission states: 
 “Despite increased efforts by the EU, deaths in the 
Mediterranean Sea occur on a daily basis. Europe 
is currently experiencing unprecedented migratory 
flows, driven by geopolitical and economic factors 
that will continue, and maybe intensify, over the 
coming years and indeed it is a global challenge with 
more than 60 million displaced persons worldwide.”21 
 The entire text is linked to geopolitical considerations 
of earlier communications. It also focuses strongly on 
numbers,22 which are presented as set to continue if not 
increase. The allusion to an ever-growing rise in the 
number is underlined by referring to the global number 
of displaced persons. In the following lines of the text, the 
Commission presents Europe as “duty bound to respond”. 
This image of strong pressure re-emerges several lines 
later: “Reports suggest that there are tens of thousands of 
migrants in Libya today, looking for ways to enter the EU”.23 
This, again, sets the scene for the Commission to introduce 
the	Partnership	Framework	as	a	meaningful	way	to	engage	
with third countries, to respond to the ‘crisis’. 
The crisis narrative also creates a discursive environment 
in which control-oriented cooperation with third 
countries is legitimised as necessary to tackle the 
‘crisis’.24	One	high-profile	example	of	this	policy	strategy	
is the EU-Turkey statement agreed in March of that same 
year, which intends to decrease border crossings from 
Turkey to the EU.25 The crisis narrative also sets the stage 
for deeper control-oriented cooperation between EU 
member states and North African states. 
This focus on numbers remains central to Commission 
communications	from	then	onwards.	Further	examples	
include a Joint Communication from January 2017, which 
discusses numbers of arrivals and the makeup of the 
migration	flows	arriving	via	the	Central	Mediterranean	
route (CMR) in 2016. Looking towards the future, this 
communication highlights a quote by Maltese Prime 
Minister Joseph Muscat: 
 “Come next Spring Europe will face a heavy influx 
of migrants through the Central Mediterranean. 
[…] I see no way in which one single Member State 
can manage or absorb this further wave. Thus, 
the essence of the core principles of the European 
Union will be seriously tested unless we act now.”25 
The focus on numbers remains central  
to Commission communications from  
2016 onwards.
The quote and its inclusion in this EU document are 
interesting	for	two	reasons.	First,	it	is	a	prime	example	
of reliance on water metaphors in international and 
EU discourses,	such	as	‘influx’	and	‘wave’	in	this	case,	
but	also	‘flows’,	‘trickle’	or	‘stream’	on	other	occasions.	
This has the effect of displaying migration movements as 
a	force	of	nature	that	is	difficult	to	contain	and	can	only	
be faced in unison. As shown by research, these kinds of 
metaphors serve to produce and reproduce a context in 
which discourses can be constructed in a certain way; in 
this case to convey a sense of emergency and an urgent 
need for action.27	As	detailed	by	Ferreira,	“expressions	
connected to natural disasters serve as a securitarian 
element in the politicians’ speech, as they imply that 
those migrants pose a threat to internal security.”28 
Second, the quote transfers a sense of critical urgency 
by alerting the audience to what seems to be a looming 
catastrophe of great dimension. Based on this assumption, 
the communication then details the importance of 
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controlling migration movements further upstream, 
particularly by supporting the Libyan Coast Guard (LCG) 
and Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA). In 
communicating the training of and support for the LCG, EU 
discourse heavily relied on the euphemism of controlling 
Libyan borders at sea, which is connected to the aim of 
reducing, as much as possible, the number of arrivals to 
European shores. 
The Commission changed its focus from 
narrating the ‘crisis’ in the context of 
‘refugees fleeing from danger’ to “primarily 
economic migrants” trying to reach the EU.
 
This ‘crisis’ mode sentiment is repeated in the July 2017 
Action Plan on the CMR. The document is striking in 
its managerial approach to the situation, based on the 
following argument: 
 “The loss of life and continuing migratory flows 
of primarily economic migrants on the Central 
Mediterranean route is a structural challenge and 
remains an issue of urgent and serious concern not 
only for Europe but also for the African continent 
as a whole.”29 
This wording makes it clear that the Commission changed 
its focus from narrating the ‘crisis’ in the context of 
‘refugees	fleeing	from	danger’	to	“primarily	economic	
migrants” trying to reach the EU. Moreover, it presents 
this as a concern for the whole of Africa, regardless of 
the different African countries’ relevance in the context. 
This goes to show that the Commission pushed for even 
greater involvement of third countries in migration 
management activities and calls on member states for 
more concerted efforts “[t]owards a sustainable crisis 
management”.30 While it does not provide much in terms 
of	specific	measures,	this	is	the	first	public	indication,	in	
mid-2017, that EU actors are looking for more systematic 
sustainability instead of an ad hoc approach. 
1.5  AUTUMN 2017: OVERCOMING THE ‘CRISIS’
In September 2017, the Commission published its 
midterm review of the European Agenda on Migration. 
In keeping with a reference made two years earlier, the 
Commission states at the beginning of the text that:
 “In the last two years, Europe experienced 
the largest number of arrivals of refugees and 
migrants since the end of the Second World War. 
[…] Migration, asylum and border management 
systems were put under huge pressure. The Union 
and its Member States were not sufficiently 
prepared to respond effectively. The scale of the 
crisis had a powerful impact across the EU.”31 
The Commission then continues to detail how the 
‘crisis’ unfolded and the measures that were taken. 
Unlike previous communications, however, the tone and 
approach of the midterm review are different in that 
it	is	reflective	and	presents	results	of	different	policy	
initiatives. According to the Commission, these initiatives 
were largely successful in reducing the number of arrivals, 
managing the external borders more effectively and 
creating a coordinated European response. As such, this 
communication departs from the heightened sense of 
alarm present in previous communications, stating instead 
that the moment has come to “focus efforts on putting in 
place the remaining building blocks of better migration 
management.”32 The reduced numbers of sea arrivals are 
important to consider in this respect. While 2015 saw more 
than one million arrivals, the number of migrants arriving 
by the end of 2017 had shrunk to 185,000.33 This was also 
reflected	in	comments	made	by	former	First	Vice-President	
Frans	Timmermans	in	September	2017:
“Our joint efforts to respond to the migration and 
refugee crisis have led to tangible results, with 
irregular arrivals significantly down in both the 
Eastern and the Central Mediterranean.”34
Given the Commission’s conceptualisation of the ‘crisis’ 
in terms of numbers, it is evident that this reduction was 
communicated as a success. The apparent decrease in 
arrival numbers is emphasised again in a communication 
from December 2017, in which the Commission charts “a 
way forward” and states that:
 “The time has come to find the solutions to move from 
an ‘ad hoc’ approach based on crisis management, 
towards a stable future-proof asylum framework, part 
of a fully integrated EU migration policy.”35 
Given the Commission’s conceptualisation 
of the ‘crisis’ in terms of numbers, it is 
evident that the reduction in arrivals was 
communicated as a success.
 
This	document	is	also	significant	in	as	far	as	it	clearly	
conveys the growing importance of the external 
dimension of EU migration policies, which is presented 
as indispensable to what the Commission calls a 
“comprehensive approach”. Interviews conducted for 
this	Discussion	Paper	also	confirmed	that	various	EU	
institutions consciously introduced the topic of migration 
into foreign policy discussions and bilateral relations 
with, for instance, African counterparts.36 
Within the overall story of the ‘crisis’, this same 
communication refers again to measures (e.g. the EU-
Turkey statement) alleviating “migratory pressure” 
on member states at the external border, and to the 
operationalisation of the EBCG to “stabilise irregular 
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flows”.	In	this	way,	the	explicit	aim	to	move	away	
from “crisis management” is complemented by a 
shift in language; away from “emergency” and 
ad hoc measures to “stabilising” and “long term” 
instruments.37 This outlook returns as the mainline in 
Commission communications throughout 2018, which 
conjure “vigilance and preparedness” to anticipate 
future migratory “crises” in a “fragile” situation. In order 
to do so, the Commission calls on EU institutions and 
member states to commit to regular coordination of 
migration management efforts.38 
1.6 LATE 2018: THE ‘CRISIS’ IS OVER?
At the end of 2018, an important milestone was 
communicated by the Commission: arrival numbers were 
at a lower level than before the ‘crisis’.39 The message 
that arrivals dropped to “pre-crisis levels” also took 
centre-stage in a March 2019 communication which 
credits the reduction to deeper cooperation with key 
partner countries.40 This is in line with the Commission’s 
conceptualisation of the ‘crisis’ in terms of numbers 
of arrivals via the EU’s external borders and their 
communication on policy priorities. While the European 
Agenda on Migration communications of 2015 placed 
great emphasis on the importance of saving lives at sea, 
the communications that followed thereafter gave an 
increasingly central role to border management. 
Finally,	in	a	speech	held	by	former	Commissioner	
Dimitris Avramopoulos in March 2019, on the progress 
made under the European Agenda on Migration, the 
priorities stated were partnerships with third countries, 
strengthening the external borders, and putting in place 
the Common European Asylum System (CEAS).41
Communications must correspond to the 
policy priorities they cover, which have 
increasingly focused on the externalisation 
of border management.
 
Naturally, communications must correspond to 
the policy priorities they cover, which – as studies 
have shown – have increasingly focused on the 
externalisation of border management.42 Yet, what is 
interesting when studying the strategic communication 
decisions of the Commission is that this externalisation 
is framed as a necessary step towards preventing 
further migratory ‘crises’.	As	such,	it	is	a	significant	
departure from tackling the ‘crisis’ by saving lives in the 
Mediterranean (2015-16) and also, to a lesser extent, 
strengthening the EU’s border management (2017).
The reduced numbers of arrivals resulting from such 
policy responses created the context in which the 
Commission	could	finally	declare	the	migration	‘crisis’	
to be over. Nearing the end of the Juncker Commission’s 
mandate, a factsheet was published in March 2019 
entitled Debunking myths about migration. This 
document unequivocally stated,
“Myth: Europe is experiencing a migration crisis. 
Fact: Europe is no longer in crisis mode”.43 
Over the last five years, the Commission 
strategically applied the narrative of the 
migration crisis.
Still, the Commission solely frames the ‘crisis’ in 
numerical terms with this statement, therefore 
keeping with its inherently problematic 
conceptualisation (see section 2). 
The ‘end of the crisis’ also featured in several 
press conferences and speeches by Commissioner 
Avramopoulos.44 In May 2019, as a written contribution to 
the EU leaders’ informal meeting in Sibiu, the Commission 
published its thinking on effective communication in times 
of increasing fragmentation and disinformation:
“[…] further accountability and clarity in decision-
making is essential to ensure more joint ownership 
of the outcome of political processes. This would 
also help to avoid a persistent ‘crisis myth’ and 
the tendency to focus communication primarily on 
points of disagreement.”45
The paragraph also includes a more general reference 
to disagreements between member states in the 
Council. Nevertheless, it shows an awareness within 
the Commission that a continuation of the crisis 
narrative in its strategic communication is 
undesirable. Several paragraphs later, the Commission 
reiterates that “[e]ven if the term ‘migration crisis in 
Europe’ still prominently features in public and political 
discourse, the reality is that arrivals to the EU have been 
brought back to pre-crisis levels.”46 
To	summarise,	it	is	clear	that	over	the	last	five	
years, the Commission applied the narrative of the 
migration crisis strategically, developing it from a 
rather unstructured usage of several wordings to an 
establishment of the ‘crisis’ as a stand-alone and 
historically unprecedented phenomenon. In response to 
this ‘crisis’, the Commission’s approach also gradually 
developed from a humanitarian framing to one focused 
on border management and cooperation with third 
countries in order to tackle security concerns. In 2019, 
the Commission decided to no longer communicate 
about an active ‘crisis’ – instead, it declared it to be 
over. The following section analyses the impact of the 
Commission’s communications up until now. On that 
basis, recommendations for the next possible steps in 
communicating about migration are provided. 
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2. A problematic narrative
Today, no one would disagree that the numbers of arrivals 
to the EU since, and particularly during, 2015-16 were 
unprecedented. The Juncker Commission did not employ 
a	codified	communication	strategy	for	its	migration	
policies.47 However, the continuous repetition of the crisis 
narrative over the years shows that the Commission 
intended	to	tell	a	specific	story	of	the	nature	of	the	‘crisis’,	
and in turn, the EU’s response. 
The ‘crisis’ provided the backbone for the 
development of increasingly restrictive 
migration policies.
 
For	the	past	four	years,	this	communicative	interpretation	
of the ‘crisis’, namely the focus on the numbers of 
migrants arriving in the EU, provided the backbone for 
the development of increasingly restrictive migration 
policies. Against this background, the continuous 
references to the crisis narrative – or, as is the most 
recent case, having ‘overcome the crisis’ – reinforce 
the legitimacy of previous communications. As shown 
by research, this stems from the continuous triggering 
of the audience’s cognitive perception of migration as 
related to a ‘crisis’.48 The repetition of such wording 
primarily continues to refer to the ‘uncontrolled numbers 
of arrivals’ and, as such, frames migration as an issue 
of security. This complicates the conceptualisation and 
discussion surrounding migration in other contexts and is 
also	significant	to	the	rise	of	populism,	as	analysed	in	the	
third section of this paper. 
At this point, it should be reiterated that, of course, 
the Commission was not the only voice in this debate. 
Rather, other actors such as the Council and member 
states themselves also applied this narrative and hence 
actively contributed to this interpretation of the ‘crisis’. 
In several cases, these communications took on an even 
more restrictive tone.49 As such, they, as much as the 
Commission, contributed to the public discourse and 
fostered an understanding of the migration ‘crisis’. 
Now, with some years of hindsight, the crisis narrative 
and its stand-alone importance in the Commission’s 
communications on migration can be closely scrutinised. 
Two questions can be raised in this respect: was this an 
appropriate communicative choice for this context? And 
what were the results of this crisis narrative?
2.1  WAS THE CRISIS NARRATIVE APPROPRIATE?
Four	years	on,	it	has	become	clear	that	the	crisis	narrative	
was inappropriate. In stating this, it is important to keep 
in mind that the Commission communicated the ‘crisis’ 
based on two factors: (i) sheer numbers and (ii) the 
uncontrolled nature of arrivals. Several arguments can 
be made against communicating the ‘crisis’ according to 
these benchmarks. 
q  First	and	foremost,	with	respect	to	numbers,	there are 
examples of other highly challenging situations 
outside of Europe that are comparable to the 
European migration ‘crisis’, and yet have not 
received the same stand-alone notoriety.	For	
instance, the European situation has been compared to 
countries such as Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. In the 
context of the Syrian War, these three neighbouring 
states have taken in a combined estimate of more than 
5.2 million people.50 In comparison, the EU28 had taken 
in a combined estimate of a little less than 950,000 
Syrians by 2018.51 This comparison is striking not only 
in terms of pure numbers, but is also impressive when 
considering	the	unequal	financial	and	infrastructural	
resources for hosting refugees between these regions.
 
Communicating the ‘crisis’ based on 
numbers and the nature of irregular 
arrivals holds no intrinsic legitimacy.
 
Other comparisons with different forms of migration 
can	be	made.	For	instance,	commentators	have	
pointed out that irregular migration may also occur 
when migrants overstay their visas after entering the 
EU	regularly	and	are	very	difficult	to	control	or	keep	
track of. The number of overstayers are thought to be 
considerable,52 and yet this phenomenon has not been 
communicated as a ‘crisis’.
These two examples serve to show that communicating 
the ‘crisis’ based on numbers and the nature of irregular 
arrivals holds no intrinsic legitimacy. They also support 
the observation that the Commission seemingly 
deprioritises other equally serious situations.
q  Second, the crisis narrative also misses the mark 
when it comes to public perceptions. Research 
on debates on migration in European countries has 
shown that “governments [focus] on numbers while 
publics are concerned about community impact and 
interaction.”53 This can then lead to citizens perceiving 
the political dialogue as irrelevant or inaccurate. 
Therefore, communicating about the ‘crisis’ in terms of 
numbers does not necessarily align with citizens’ main 
concerns regarding the impact of migration on the 
economy and security. 
13
q  Third, the point is not that ‘migration’ cannot be linked 
to ‘crisis’. Rather, communication actors should 
be aware of the gravity of the latter and apply it 
suitably. In this context, several commentators have 
proposed that talking about a ‘migration management 
crisis’ would have been more appropriate in the context 
of the 2015-16 developments and their aftermath.54 This 
would have entailed a greater focus on (failed) policies 
rather than the numbers of arrivals. At the time, and as 
analysed	in	this	Paper’s	first	section,	the	Commission	
did indeed admonish member states for their slow and 
incomplete implementation of migration management 
instruments. With hindsight, the Commission has 
also admitted that the EU and its member states were 
unprepared to respond adequately to the increased 
numbers of arrivals. Nevertheless, none of these 
communications used the ‘crisis’ label, unlike those 
referring to the scale of migrants’ arrivals. 
Overall, the Commission’s use of the crisis narrative 
has not been accurate, neither in its description of past 
phenomena nor in addressing citizens’ concerns.
2.2  WHAT WAS THE IMPACT OF THE “CRISIS” 
NARRATIVE?
The crisis narrative had a highly problematic impact on 
the politics surrounding EU migration policies, including 
both political discourses and policy measures. Six impacts 
are	particularly	significant,	as	will	be	explained	below.	
First,	the	crisis	narrative	has contributed to a context 
in which mainstream political actors have been 
enticed to shift their communications on migration 
to the right. As calls from right-wing populists for more 
restrictive policy measures to tackle the ‘crisis’ have grown 
louder, mainstream political actors have felt the need 
to change their discourses in the hope of hanging on to 
once-loyal voters.55 At the same time, such right-wing 
discourses reinforce the crisis narrative further, setting 
circular dynamics into motion. This is a slippery downward 
slope in that right-wing populist communications have 
gradually become more mainstream as both conservative, 
and socialist and liberal parties have taken over populist 
discourse and policy proposals, too. 
Right-wing populists seek to maintain 
the perception of migration as 
dangerous, which can only be met by the 
nationalisation of immigration regimes.
 
Second, the Danish Socialist Democratic Party has for 
instance increasingly aligned itself with political positions 
usually associated with conservative parties. Most recently, 
commentators have observed that in response to the 
success of far-right parties, the Danish Social Democrats 
have gradually taken on an extreme anti-immigration 
stance.56	Party	leader	Mette	Frederiksen	has	spoken	of	
the need to eliminate immigrant “ghettos”, a term also 
employed by the right-wing populist Prime Minister of 
Hungary,	Victor	Orbán.57 
However, discursive strategies that replicate populist 
communication strategies are not as straightforward as 
they may seem and do not necessarily bring the expected 
effect. Populist parties advance seemingly “authentic” 
messages through direct, unconstrained and polarising 
communication.58 Mainstream political actors have 
difficulties	reproducing	these	dynamics,	which	makes	
winning	over	supporters	more	difficult	than	it	may	initially	
seem.59 In addition, and in doing so, they also make it easy 
for right-wing populists to perpetuate their preferred 
communication strategies and reinforce fears about 
‘masses of immigrants’. In this context, it is helpful to 
keep in mind that as Graef has stated, 
“narratives, stories, and frames have one important 
thing in common: they are all rooted in a certain 
degree of selectivity based on the values, norms, 
and identity of an individual or group. […] They are 
never neutral.”60
In this vein, right-wing populists seek to maintain the 
perception of migration as dangerous, which can only be 
met by the nationalisation of immigration regimes. 
An example of this can be seen in the continued 
extensions of internal border controls in the Schengen 
area. Right-wing conservative politicians originally 
started spreading the message that border controls 
were necessary to preserve the Schengen area. Once 
reinstated, however, these border controls did little to 
alleviate the original concerns or messaging. Rather, 
the original actors continued voicing concerns around 
national sovereignty and started advocating ever more 
for far-reaching measures.61 This shows how mimicking 
right-wing discourses can sometimes have unintended or 
harmful effects.62
Second, research on the topic has found that in adopting 
such strategies, mainstream parties run the risk of 
strengthening support for right-wing populist parties 
as more attention is placed on topics from which such 
parties easily benefit. By raising the salience of migration 
in this way, right-wing ideas can break their own (online) 
echo chambers and reach a much greater audience.63 
The radical right parties might also be able to ‘unlock’ 
certain segments of the electorate that had not considered 
voting for them before through such dynamics.64 More 
specifically,	the	crisis	narrative	of	migration	can	fuel	anti-
immigration sentiment among parts of the population that 
are predisposed to seeing migration more critically. In this 
way, certain aspects of migration that can be perceived 
as threats to conservative values (e.g. security, tradition) 
have activated pre-existing anti-migration sentiments.65 
In short, the crisis narrative has created a context in 
which right-wing voices and ideas are normalised and 
then	amplified	far	further	than	their	actual	organic	reach,	
which translates, in certain cases, into increased electoral 
successes for radical right-wing parties.66 
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Such developments have been observed at the EU level 
during the last few years.67	For	instance,	and	by	drawing	
on a perceived necessity of tackling the migration ‘crisis’ 
ahead of the European Parliament elections in 2019, 
right-wing populist parties enjoyed unprecedented 
levels of attention (even if their total gains fell short 
of expectations).68 Similar dynamics can be observed 
on the national level, too. Parties such as Alternative 
for	Germany	(AfD),	Lega	in	Italy	or	the	Freiheitliche	
Partei	Österreichs	(FPÖ)	in	Austria	have	successfully	
built election campaigns on right-wing and restrictive 
migration narratives and thereby expanded their  
base of supporters.
By framing migration as a ‘threat’ to  
public order and security, it becomes  
easier to legitimise more restrictive 
migration policies.
 
Third, in imitating right-wing populists, the crisis 
narrative can lead to self-harm as it also enables 
the perpetuation of populist discourses that seek 
to blame the EU. Research has shown that populist 
communication makes strategic use of citizens’ 
emotions, such as anger and fear. As such, it seeks to 
blame the EU for not doing enough to address popular 
concerns.69 In the context of the migration ‘crisis’, it 
has been – and still is – easy for politicians like former 
Italian Minister of the Interior Matteo Salvini or the AfD 
to level accusations that the EU is not doing enough ‘to 
stop the invasion’.70
Fourth,	the	crisis	narrative limits what can be 
communicated, in that it overstates the centrality 
of certain emergency measures.71 This can lead to 
significant	attention	gaps	in	other	policy	areas.	As	the	
‘crisis’ was communicated as an emergency, it was 
difficult	to	put	a	bigger	focus	on	integration	measures,	
for instance. Rather, communications on policies in 
the context of border management are a much more 
natural	fit	to	the	frame	of	the	‘crisis’	and	hence	easier	
to communicate through such discursive approaches. 
In addition, one could argue that migration in itself 
has become a ‘crisis issue’, which undermines the 
ability of the EU and member states to communicate 
on and legislate migration constructively. This is highly 
problematic as migration will continue to be a major 
feature of European countries and become necessary to 
uphold the standard of living in ageing societies.
Fifth,	and	in	a	general	sense,	through	the	sustained	
use of the crisis narrative, a shift to control-oriented 
policy measures has taken place following so-called 
‘securitisation’ dynamics. As this particular framing 
also presents migration as a ‘threat’ to public order and 
security, it can lead to an exclusionary perception of 
migrants as a danger to internal, cultural and welfare 
security that should be closely controlled.72 In this way, 
and by creating an emergency context, it becomes easier 
to legitimise more restrictive migration policies.73 In turn, 
and as observed in several cases, these policies can  
also give rise to humanitarian crises that are still  
ongoing today. 
A frequently mentioned example in this respect is the 
link between the policy measures adopted and the 
humanitarian crisis taking place in the CMR, which, 
between 2015 and 2019, has cost approximately 
12,000 lives.74 Research has shown that policy changes 
implemented during the ‘crisis’ – such as the scaling 
down of Operation Sophia’s mandate, the crackdown 
on search and rescue (SAR) NGOs or cooperation with 
the LCG – have increased the relative mortality rate 
on the CMR.75 In this context, strengthening the LCG’s 
capacities to control Libyan waters and borders was one 
element of the EU and the member states’ responses to 
controlling migration crossings in the Mediterranean. 
The EU-Turkey statement is another point in case. It was 
originally devised to end migration from Turkey to the 
EU. It has been argued, however, that it also exacerbated 
the conditions of the hotspots on the Greek islands and 
created a situation in which the human rights of migrants 
as well as the principle of non-refoulement have been put 
at risk.76
As	a	sixth	and	final	impact,	the	crisis	narrative	has	
also created a context conducive to more ad hoc 
policymaking.	More	specifically,	in	this	context	short-
term emergency measures took priority over more 
sustainable and future-oriented policymaking. The 
unstructured approach to relocating refugees who 
disembarked in Italy or Malta during the spring and 
summer of 2019 provide an example. In a politically tense 
climate,	member	states	could	not	agree	on	a	codified	
disembarkation mechanism, leading to several SAR boats 
being stranded at sea for weeks.77 The informal nature 
of these arrangements, however, as argued by Carrera 
and Cortinovis, raise serious concerns regarding their 
fundamental rights compliance.78 In addition, such ad 
hoc policy instruments have also been unhelpful in 
furthering EU integration in the area of justice and home 
affairs. It can be argued that they have exacerbated gaps 
which already exist in EU asylum and migration policies 
concerning crises, such as a fundamental lack of solidarity 
between member states.79 
In summary, this section of the Discussion Paper has 
presented arguments to support the claim that the 
crisis narrative employed by the Commission has 
not been appropriate to the situation at hand. In 
addition, it has given rise to serious political issues, 
from a surge of right-wing populist discourses to a shift 
towards more control-oriented policies. Going forward, 
it is important that the Commission fully abandons the 
crisis narrative in the migration context and develops 
more accurate and coherent communication strategies.
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3.  Towards a new migration narrative for the 
European Commission
Developing a blueprint for the Commission’s 
communication on migration is – admittedly – not an 
easy	task.	It	can	be	especially	difficult	as	unforeseeable	
events also need to be spontaneously communicated, 
and with much consideration. This imposes a certain 
need	for	adaptability	and	flexibility.	Nevertheless,	in	
what follows, some recommendations are provided 
that can support a more constructive and forward-
looking approach to communicating about migration.80 
The recommendations are complemented with several 
examples to give an idea of how they can be applied in 
practice (see Table 1 at the end of this section).
3.1  DEVELOP A CODIFIED COMMUNICATION 
STRATEGY
As emerged from several interviews conducted for this 
project, the Juncker Commission did not work on the 
basis	of	a	codified	communication	strategy	in	the	context	
of migration.81 Instead, it developed standpoints and 
‘lines to take’ by consecutively building on previous 
communication materials.82 The new Commission 
should, as a matter of priority, develop a proactive 
communication strategy on migration, which 
anticipates	specific	policies	or	events	that	are	to	be	
communicated at a certain point in time as much as 
possible.	Naturally,	such	a	strategy	must	be	flexible	
enough to react and adequately cover unplanned or 
unpredictable developments. Nonetheless, certain 
communicative points can and should be agreed on in 
advance in order to create more strategic messages and 
long-term visions. This will also help the Commission  
to be more proactive in setting the communicative 
scene on migration. 
3.2  CONSIDER SALIENCE ISSUES
As	a	starting	point,	and	before	discussing	specific	
recommendations, some attention should be given to 
the concept of ‘salience’, namely the degree of concern 
or importance awarded to a certain issue.83 Policymakers 
should take note of how a high salience of migration 
is linked with a rising politicisation of the issue 
along ideological lines.84 This is to say that the higher 
migration climbs on the political agenda, the more it 
becomes an attractive issue for right-wing populists to 
capitalise on. This, in turn, explains their motivation 
behind maintaining high levels of alarm regarding 
migration and hence sustaining a high issue salience. 
An awareness of these dynamics, however, should 
not prevent mainstream political actors from 
communicating on migration. Several communication 
officials	have	indeed	expressed	weariness	of	
communicating too frequently about migration.85 As 
most people working on the topic in the EU context 
would testify, the salience of migration fostered a 
politically charged environment further where reaching 
agreements	has	been	exceedingly	difficult.86 It is 
therefore important to be aware of the impact that 
frequent communication and a connected rise of issue 
salience can have on political decision-making and the 
influence	of	anti-immigration	forces	in	particular,	as	
documented above.87 
It is important to be aware of the impact 
that frequent communication can have on 
the influence of anti-immigration forces.
 
Nevertheless, not communicating about the issues at 
hand is not a viable option either. Quite the opposite, not 
communicating (enough) about issues that are clearly of 
concern to a majority of European citizens would almost 
certainly	backfire,	as	right-wing	populist	forces	have	no	
qualms about misusing migration as a communicative 
tool to advance their fear-mongering tactics. In this 
context, Commissioner Avramopoulos acknowledged 
in early 2019 that “alarmist discourses are poisoning 
our citizens on a daily basis.”88 Not communicating 
about	migration	sufficiently	would	also	raise	questions	
as to the Commission’s priority management. This is 
especially important, as the Standard Eurobarometer of 
autumn 2018 has found that citizens consistently rank 
the migration issue as more important at the EU rather 
than national level.89 Researchers have deducted from this 
that citizens see migration as a political priority for the 
EU rather than an issue facing them daily.90 While there 
is a case to be made for not ‘over-communicating’ an 
issue and therefore raising alarm levels again, it is 
the tone and contextualisation rather than frequency 
of communications about migration that need to be 
adjusted. The following points consider this argument 
more closely.
3.3  EMPLOY MORE DIVERSE FRAMES
It	is,	first	and	foremost,	important	to	abandon narratives 
that present refugees and migrants – and particularly 
their numbers – as an issue that must be addressed 
in the framework of ‘crisis management’. As analysed 
above, communicating about migration through a 
security frame has contributed to the crisis narrative, 
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and can lead to increased support for anti-immigration 
parties and harm mainstream political actors. To 
adequately pre-empt such dynamics, the Commission 
should diversify the frames it uses when communicating 
about migration. There certainly are issues connected 
to migration that merit a security focus. However, it is 
important to underline that not all migration movements 
present security issues. There are other ways of framing 
migration at the EU level that would not play into the 
hands nor rhetoric of right-wing actors. More generally, 
greater	diversification	of	frames,	adaptable	according	
to the different topics discussed, would lead to a more 
balanced discussion on migration. 
A greater diversification of frames would 
lead to a more balanced discussion  
on migration.
 
To give an example, communication on integration 
policy lends itself easily to different framing exercises, 
keeping in mind that this is a policy area on which the 
EU has limited competences. In what follows, three 
possible frames are presented. 
q  Applying a security frame could help present 
integration policies as crucial for creating more 
harmonious societies and thus prevent conflict 
between different groups. This frame could 
also be appropriate when communicating about 
deradicalisation programmes for third-country 
nationals	or	EU	citizens	fighting	in	conflicts	abroad.	
q  Employing an economic frame would enable a 
narrative about integration in terms of the added 
economic benefits of migration.91 As research has 
shown, European societies are ageing and labour 
markets need immigration to uphold welfare systems.92 
Citizens are becoming increasingly more open to 
accepting migration as a solution to these issues.93 
An economic frame could also portray migrants as 
active and valuable participants to society (e.g. by 
contributing to social welfare systems with their 
taxes, opening up new markets that are linked to their 
countries of origin). 
q  Communicating about integration through a 
humanitarian values frame can give more weight 
to ethical considerations and the value basis of 
migrant integration. As such, integration measures 
can be communicated as enabling migrants to become 
fully-fledged	and	democratically	responsible	members	
of society. A similar values-based approach has been 
applied before to the area of forced migration and 
concerning member states’ legal responsibility to grant 
asylum to those in need of protection.94 Applying such 
a frame for integration contexts may also help raise the 
audience’s empathy levels. It could be appropriate, for 
instance, when communicating funding opportunities 
for grassroots organisations or local communities that 
work to integrate refugees or migrants. 
In sum, different frames serve different communication 
needs, and the appropriateness of each frame must be 
considered according to the policies they describe and  
the narratives they should convey. It is in any event 
important to consider the wide variety of frames that can 
be used and not limit communication to security-oriented 
frames alone.
3.4  RELY ON STORYTELLING
Communication about migration should find a 
healthier balance between various communication 
aspects, such as numbers and personal stories. This 
is	something	which	many	communication	officials	are	
already aware of.95	More	specifically,	a	better	balance	
needs to be found between, on the one hand, considering 
numerical or operational facts and, on the other, 
presenting stories about migration policies.96 As studies 
have shown, personal testimonies and storytelling are 
very effective in raising an audience’s empathy levels.97 
These tools have therefore become staples in strategic 
business communications as well as NGO advocacy efforts 
to create compelling narratives.98 A good example of 
applying these techniques to the Union’s institutional 
context can be found in the Commission’s EU Protects 
campaign which explains how different institutions in 
the EU collaborate on issues impacting safety, health, 
environment and societies in Europe.99 It does so by 
featuring “local heroes”, thereby giving a human face to 
what are in fact complex processes. 
Personal testimonies and storytelling 
are very effective in raising an audience’s 
empathy levels.
 
As a less ideal example, EU communications on return 
policies	are,	instead,	a	field	where	communications	often	
took on a rather technical tone. In these communications, 
the Commission speaks, for instance, of “return 
decisions”, “return procedures”, “return management 
systems” and the aim of “increas[ing] effective returns”.100 
This might help convey the technicalities of return 
operations. However, it also presents the return of 
migrants in a very abstract way. To break down the 
complexity of these policies and reach a larger audience, 
a greater focus could be put on the stories of 
returned migrants. Communications could be made 
more tangible, for instance, by narrating the stories of 
individual	migrants	experiencing	these	policies	first-hand	
and including basic information about their background 
and journeys, as is appropriate. This would give more 
space to answer why these migrants are being returned 
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and how this works in practice. It would also provide an 
opportunity to show how a person’s fundamental rights 
are being observed during a return process, potentially 
opening up a space to talk about the human rights of the 
concerned migrants.
Evidence-based communications should be 
the foundation for all EU communications 
on migration.
 
In addition, the Commission should abandon the 
exclusive focus on numbers for two main reasons. 
First,	numbers	and	statistics	are	more	difficult	to	convey	
to an audience directly and almost always require 
an explanation to frame them within their context. 
This complicates direct communication.101 Second, an 
overreliance on numbers all too easily leads to reverting 
to a ‘crisis’ (or ‘end of crisis’) mode. As such, it also 
constitutes a mode of communication that can be 
recycled by third actors, particularly right-wing populists, 
to create a platform for alarming and harmful agendas. 
Emotional storytelling, on the other hand, can lend itself 
to more personal stories of migrants or communities that 
exceed a focus on numbers yet avoid turning into sob 
stories. In this way, storytelling does not necessarily have 
to renounce factual details. On the contrary, evidence-
based communications should be the foundation for all 
EU communications on migration. Especially in times 
of ‘fake news’ and ‘alternative information’ spread by 
populist right-wing forces, it is of utmost importance to 
maintain a reliable and transparent presentation of facts 
that	can	be	checked	and	verified	independently.
3.5  CONSIDER DIFFERENT CONTEXTS AND 
TARGET AUDIENCE GROUPS
There is extensive research on audience segmentation 
and how values and opinions should be taken into 
account when formulating communication messages.102 
On this basis, the Commission should gain a better 
understanding of the diverse audience groups  
in the EU and shape its communications in order to 
target them. In what follows, a number of insights  
from this literature are discussed and linked to 
communication strategies.
As	a	baseline,	it	is	clear	that	communication	officials	
should know their audience before formulating a 
message. Research on public opinion has found that 
attitudes on migration in the EU have remained relatively 
stable and neutral, and have even improved in some 
countries after 2015.103 There was only a modest increase 
in anti-immigration sentiment, which was mostly among 
citizens in Central Europe.104 Studies have also found that 
individuals’ values are crucial in explaining attitudes 
towards migration, even more so than the effects of 
sociodemographic characteristics.105	For	instance,	
attachment to conservative values can go hand in hand 
with lower support for immigration, while those with 
more universalistic values are usually more supportive 
of immigration.106 It is therefore important to take note 
of research on audiences at the national level and to 
differentiate	between	society	groups	that	are	specific	to	
EU member states.107 
In this regard, much attention has been paid to the 
‘movable middle’ which, on a spectrum of values, 
represents those members of society that do not fully 
subscribe to either liberal or conservative values. Studies 
have shown that this segment of the population is 
likely to see the positive social and economic impact 
of migration. This has led researchers to conclude that 
there is a far larger proportion of the society that is 
leaning more towards the values typically associated 
with societies that are open towards migration. This 
then means that this ‘middle’ section of society may 
not be as neutral as previously assumed.108 In general, 
it seems evident that a more liberal and open narrative 
on migration would resonate with larger proportions of 
the EU population than is often assumed.109 Accordingly, 
constructive and forward-looking communications on 
migration are likely to fall on fertile ground, more so 
than is often assumed in the current political climate. 
Communication actors should therefore not shy away 
from defending the positive value of migration for 
societies when tailoring messages for this ‘middle’ 
section of the audience.
A more liberal and open narrative on 
migration would resonate with larger 
proportions of the EU population than is 
often assumed.
 
At the same time, other audience groups in society should 
not be left unaddressed. Rather, communication needs 
to be shaped according to a certain group’s opinion. 
While passionate liberals may never agree with a policy 
on border control, nor staunch conservatives support 
expanding legal pathways, both groups nevertheless 
need to be included in communication efforts on why 
such policies are needed. The content of communication 
output should be consistent and coherent throughout. 
However, the delivery of communication material could 
still be tailored by taking into account the values of the 
targeted audience group.110
Strategic communications must take these differences 
into	account	to	be	effective.	While	this	might	be	difficult	
when drafting EU-wide communications, the Commission 
could nevertheless explore avenues for increased 
communication efforts at the national or local levels. The 
Commission has collaborated with its representations 
in member states as well as with third countries to 
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communicate about issues that are relevant for a certain 
audience.111 Another possible avenue to explore would be 
to draw more on the expertise of local PR companies. 
These are often much better placed to truly understand 
the context in which they are operating and how to target 
a	specific	audience.	To	go	a	step	further,	there	is	also	a	
case to be made in communicating with EU citizens 
directly, in addition to communicating at the government 
level and with journalists by way of highly tailored 
briefings.	This	gives	the	Commission	more	control	in	
steering the message, instead of being overly reliant on 
national media to translate complex issues to respective 
audiences. This would likely necessitate additional 
resources. Still, in times of increasingly inward-looking 
national politics, a more relatable communication style 
would go a long way to create a more direct, and sorely 
needed, connection with citizens.112
3.6  DELIVER MESSAGES IN A MORE 
RELATABLE AND DIGESTIBLE MANNER
In	addition	to	targeting	specific	audience	groups	as	
specified	above,	a greater focus should be put on 
making the style and tone of communications more 
relatable and clarifying the impact of said policy on 
individuals’ lives. This is the case, for instance, in respect 
of the continuation of controls at the EU’s internal borders, 
which were set up as a policy response to the ‘uncontrolled’ 
movement of migrants between EU member states in 
2015-16 and which persist until now. They do, however, 
disproportionally affect individuals frequently crossing the 
borders for work reasons, for instance, and therefore  
have a personal and negative impact on a considerable 
number of EU citizens. 
The Commission should also strive to present messages on 
migration policies in a more digestible manner. Similar to 
the above point about understanding audiences better, this 
would help establish more direct and closer connections 
to those audiences. To this end, it should explore whether 
actors closer to national audiences – instead of what 
some perceive as EU ‘elites’ – could be empowered to 
deliver the message. Several UN agencies, for instance, 
have successfully employed so-called goodwill ambassadors 
from	various	fields	of	public	life	to	give	more	prominence	
and publicity to UN initiatives. The Commission might also 
consider a similar initiative. 
Moreover, various EU institutions have already recognised 
that their staff, if given the necessary leeway and briefed 
accordingly, can act as effective ambassadors towards their 
national audiences and present a more approachable image 
of the EU.113 This goes for both real-life encounters, such as 
presenting at public events and for their online presence 
via various social media channels. The Commission already 
works	with	internal	technical	tools	by	which	officials	
share examples of social media engagement that can be 
used as a blueprint for other colleagues.114 Such initiatives 
should be strengthened and expanded to foster the 
spread of best practices. In other words, a consistent and 
centralised strategy can be delivered through decentralised 
communication channels. 
Furthermore,	and	as	drawn	from	several	interviews,	there	is	
an awareness that translating all communications into 
the EU’s 24 official languages is imperative.115	In	the	field	
of migration policies, this is not yet done comprehensively 
but should be implemented by all institutions and agencies 
working on the topic to reach national audiences more 
easily. Again, employing additional resources in this context 
could	generate	worthwhile	benefits	in	strengthening	
citizen’s access to EU communication output. 
3.7  LINK MIGRATION ISSUES TO THEIR 
RESPECTIVE CONTEXTS
As	a	final	recommendation,	it	is	also	advisable	to	link	
communication on migration to other relevant policy 
areas, both horizontally and vertically. Some economic or 
social policies, for instance, can be impacted by migration 
policies and vice versa. Equally, there is a need to refer 
to national measures on other migration issues at the 
member state level – as long as it is relevant and in line 
with the Commission’s mandate. This would also help to 
alleviate certain concerns about migration that are very 
much linked to their respective context and would 
find	a	more	accurate	answer	in	other	policy	areas.	For	
instance, a perceived scarcity of jobs on the national 
level is often wrongfully attributed to an increase in the 
number of migrants, and thus best be tackled through 
labour market reforms rather than more restrictive 
migration policies. Communications on migration 
need to take this into account so that core concerns are 
disentangled and migration is no longer be used as a 
scapegoat for other issues.
Do Don’t
Consider salience issues Be silent on migration issues
Employ differentiated framing Only use a security frame
Rely on storytelling Focus on numbers
Target audience groups’ different values Rely on one-size-fits-all communication
Make messages more relatable and relevant for local contexts Use a removed style or focus on the EU level only
Make communications more easily digestible Employ bureaucratic language
Link migration (issues) to the respective context See migration as a stand-alone issue
Table 1: Summarised recommendations for communicating about migration
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Conclusions
The arrival numbers of refugees and migrants to the EU 
over	the	past	five	years	have	been	unprecedented.	In	
communicating about this phenomenon, the Commission 
applied the narrative of the migration crisis strategically, 
developing it from a rather unstructured usage of several 
terms to establishing the ‘crisis’ as a stand-alone and 
historically unprecedented phenomenon. The Commission 
has communicated about the ‘crisis’ based on two factors: 
(i) numbers and (ii) the uncontrolled nature of arrivals.  
The continuous repetition and reinforcement of this 
narrative	based	on	these	factors	portray	a	specific	story	of	
the nature of the ‘crisis’. In 2019, the declared end of the 
‘crisis’ along these interpretative lines actually reinforced 
this narrative further. 
On that basis, this Discussion Paper has argued that the 
Commission’s use of the crisis narrative has not been 
accurate, neither in its description of past phenomena 
nor addressing of citizens’ concerns. Instead, it framed 
the number and nature of arrivals as a security issue. 
This legitimised the development of increasingly 
restrictive migration policies that focused on border 
management and cooperation with third countries in 
order to manage migration and tackle the ‘crisis’. 
This	communicative	strategy,	however,	has	backfired.	
It was inappropriate given the far larger numbers 
of refugees hosted in third countries and ongoing 
humanitarian crises that, in comparison, did not 
receive the same attention. It also ignored the fact 
that	a	significant	part	of	the	‘crisis’	is	related	to	policy	
problems and mismanagement rather than the sheer 
number of arrivals.
More problematic, however, are the political dynamics 
connected to this crisis narrative. The narrative has 
helped create a context in which right-wing populist 
forces have been able to accuse mainstream actors of not 
doing enough to tackle the ‘crisis’. Not only are these 
actors able to exploit the situation for their own political 
gain, but they have also managed an overall shift to the 
right: in both discourses on migration and legislation 
introduced as a response to populist, and often 
xenophobic, rhetoric. In this way, right-wing voices and 
ideas are increasingly reaching the mainstream. 
To counter these dynamics and create a more 
progressive and forward-looking narrative on migration, 
this Paper proposes a number of considerations that 
could be useful for the new Commission’s strategic 
communication on migration:
q  Taking account of salience issues without letting 
these considerations prevent communication output.
q  Employing differentiated framing and abandoning the 
security frame as the primary choice for constructing 
a narrative on migration. Rather, a more diverse 
choice of frames that also speaks to, for instance, 
economic concerns or values-based issues would be 
more adequate.
q  Giving more room to stories in addition to technical 
details as a useful way of making communications 
more accessible to audiences.
q  Tailoring communications by taking into account 
the national context and different audience groups’ 
values and beliefs.
q  Making the manner in which migration is 
communicated more relatable and easily digestible 
for audiences.
q  Linking migration issues to their respective context, 
for instance by showcasing links with other policy 
areas, instead of seeing them as stand-alone concerns.
The topic of migration will continue to present a 
communication challenge that can only be addressed 
through clear and strategic communications. This Paper 
has sought to put forward several recommendations 
that can be used by the Commission towards this 
end. Taken together, they aim to move Commission 
communications on migration beyond the ‘crisis’.
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